Deposit Insurance and Moral Hazards: A Theoretical Discourse

Kalu Ebere Ume, Oleka, Chioma D, Alice Chinwe Obasikene


Moral Hazards represent one of the key arguments against deposit insurance. it is believed that liberal deposit insurance encourage recklessness and mindless risk taking on the part of managers of banking institutions. this informs the discussion on this all important issue. a survey of and empirical literature is made on the issue as raised. the study is a position paper on the moral hazards. At the end of the survey, it was found out that there is a consensus on the fact that deposit insurance is greatly important but that efforts should be designed to make it better

co-ordinated with the view to mitigating the incidences of moral hazards.

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